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For more than a decade, federal health regulatory agencies
have devoted major attention to controlling human exposure to
substances believed capable of causing cancer. These efforts have
evoked a broad spectrum of criticism; government has been ac-
cused of both indolence in the face of an incipient epidemic' and
reckless distortion of science to support restrictions on substances
that present only trivial risks.2
A central object of regulatory concern has been the safety of
the food supply. At least since the 1958 Food Additives Amend-
ment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act),'
with its famous Delaney Clause,4 the Food and Drug Administra-
* Dean and Daniel Caplin Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. A.B.
1959, LL.B. 1964, Columbia University; M.A. 1966, Oxford University. This Article is based
upon a speech delivered at the annual meeting of the Institute of Medicine in October 1983.
I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Scott Kleger, Class of 1986, University of Virginia
Law School.
1. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FuND & R. BOYLE, MALIGNANT NEGLECT 3 (1979)
(attributing the "cancer epidemic" in part to government's failure to recognize that most
cancers are environmentally caused and the failure to take preventive measures).
2. See, e.g., E. EFRON, THE APocALYPTIcs: CANCER AND THE BIG LIE (1984) (arguing that
"regulatory science" is devoid of logic, id. at 293, is unable to differentiate between carcino-
gens and noncarcinogens, id. at 308, and that regulation, therefore, is based upon a "no-safe-
dose theory," which holds that a substance is not safe if it contains even the smallest
amount of a carcinogen, id. at 335).
3. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040, amended by
Food Additives Amendment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1764 (codified as
further amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982)).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1982). The Delaney Clause provides in pertinent part:
[N]o additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested
by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation
of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal ....
Id. See generally Merrill, Regulating Carcinogens in Food: A Legislator's Guide to the
Food Safety Provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 171,
178-84 (1978) (discussing the origin and interpretation of the Delaney Clause).
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tion (FDA) has sought, with mixed success, to identify food con-
stituents that pose cancer risks and to eliminate them from food.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which is responsible
for setting permissible pesticide levels in food, has displayed simi-
lar concern for the elimination of carcinogenic residues in foods
that comprise important parts of the American diet. I do not pro-
pose here to evaluate the success of the FDA's and the EPA's ef-
forts to prevent the addition of hazardous chemicals to the food
supply. While that is certainly an important issue, this Article ex-
plores the potentially greater challenges to regulation presented by
recent assessments suggesting highly significant associations be-
tween traditional foods and cancer incidence.5 This Article does
not identify all the relevant issues or exhaust analysis of those it
does address; the objective is to sketch the broad contours of fu-
ture debate.
To dramatize the novel regulatory problems that these recent
assessments pose, it is useful to summarize the basic features of
current food safety regulation. First is the implicit assumption that
traditional foods, and particularly those eaten with minimum
processing, are safe. Man's "contributions" to foods-artificial in-
gredients, chemicals used in production, preservation, and packag-
ing, and accidental industrial contaminants-are the main source
of risk. Second, current regulation generally assesses food constitu-
ents individually, and in isolation. To be sure, the FD&C Act, like
its predecessor,6 permits the FDA to curb the sale of complete
foods that pose risks to health, but this authority rarely has been
invoked, and the modern regulatory tools-essentially forms of li-
censure-are geared to controlling individual ingredients, such as
food and color additives, and contaminants, such as pesticide resi-
dues, animal drugs, or environmental chemicals. Regulators assess
whether a specific substance, as found in food, might cause harm.
The relevant data come from tests of that substance alone; the as-
sessment of safety focuses on the capacity to harm living orga-
nisms, the relationship between that capacity and dosage, and the
5. For illustrative purposes, I rely primarily on the Report of the Committee on Diet,
Nutrition, and Cancer of the National Research Council, published under the title Diet,
Nutrition, and Cancer (National Academy Press 1982) [hereinafter cited as NRC Report].
This report is not the only important study of the problem, but it is the most comprehen-
sive and balanced. For a list of other recent reports and recommendations concerning diet-
ary practices and disease prevention, see Hutt, Regulatory Implementation of Dietary Rec-
ommendations, 36 FoOD DRUG CoshL L.J. 66, 167-168 (1981).
6. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938).
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levels at which humans are likely to be exposed. Almost no atten-
tion is given to how a substance may interact with other sub-
stances in the food, to the effects of other foods, or to relative risks
posed by other frequently encountered food constituents.
This narrow focus is dictated largely by practical considera-
tions. To predict, much less measure, interactions among food sub-
stances is almost impossible. Further, even if measurement tech-
niques were available, regulators ordinarily could not afford to use
them. Finally, even if time were not a constraint and data were not
expensive to obain, the intellectual task of calculating the effects of
the several thousand substances found in food in a multitude of
combinations would be beyond the capacity of every regulatory
(and scientific) institution in the country.7
Recent studies of the relationship between diet and disease
are beginning to challenge the established regulatory framework.
These studies suggest that substances in food do contribute to dis-
ease-and to cancer specifically. They also suggest that the real
culprits are not few and foreign, but are ubiquitous and occur nat-
urally in many agricultural commodities. The foods providing the
greatest concentrations of risk-increasing material comprise impor-
tant parts of popular diets and represent major products of Ameri-
can agriculture. Moreover, some dietary constituents appear to be
useful in preventing cancer, but these substances are found in
foods of modest economic significance and popularity. Finally, the
risk of disease for individuals is linked closely to lifetime dietary
patterns rather than to occasional encounters with individual toxi-
cants. Under these circumstances, a regulatory regime geared to
identifying individual toxicants and removing them from the food
supply may seem ill-suited or at least inadequate. If diet-induced
cancer is of concern, the government must devise more effective
means with which to deal with the problem.
7. The historical origins of federal regulation of foods and drugs also help explain the
FDA's current focus. In 1906, when the first federal food and drug statute was enacted,
federal authority was viewed narrowly and was confined, as a matter of constitutional the-
ory, to goods as they moved across state lines. It was logical, therefore, for the FDA to
emulate the usher at the movie theater, checking each would-be patron for a ticket-one at
a time. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the prevailing single constituent focus of food
safety regulation is reinforced by the threshold assumption that the dietary risks of real
concern are those posed by substances added to food by man.
1985]
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II. THE NEXUS BETWEEN DIET AND CANCER
Scientists interested in disease prevention have studied the re-
lationship between dietary components and cancer for many years.
Recent assessments by the National Research Council (NRC) and
others do not break new scientific ground, but rather evaluate and
summarize the work of many researchers extending over a long pe-
riod. Nonetheless, the assessments have captured attention be-
cause of their broad coverage and the prominence, and presumed
objectivity, of their sources. This Article will not survey all of these
assessments but will simply focus on the most notable: the 1982
report by the NRC entitled Diet, Nutrition, and Cancer (NRC
Report).8
The NRC Report cautions that current understanding of the
relationship between diet and cancer is neither complete nor re-
fined, and in fact is scarcely more sophisticated than the under-
standing of the relationship between smoking and cancer that pre-
vailed in the early 1960's. The task of relating dietary patterns to
cancer incidence has proved difficult. Regulators have only crude
information about what foods, and particularly in what quantity,
individuals actually eat. Additionally, according to the Report,
most foods are complex mixtures of largely unknown composition.
Nonetheless, several studies of human population groups have re-
vealed strong associations between dietary patterns and the risk of
developing specific types of cancer. According to the NRC Com-
mittee on Diet, Nutrition, and Cancer (NRC Committee), the evi-
dence suggests that diets high in fat or containing cured or smoked
foods tend to increase the risk of cancer, while diets containing
large quantities of certain fruits and vegetables may decrease can-
cer incidence.9 These general conclusions from epidemiological
studies have been supplemented by laboratory investigations
designed to elucidate the mechanisms by which dietary compo-
nents may influence the process of carcinogenesis.
The NRC Committee's findings can be summarized under the
following headings.
8. See supra note 5.
9. A more recent National Cancer Institute report, in addition to echoing these conclu-
sions, suggests that diets high in fiber may reduce cancer risk. See Office of Cancer Commu-
nications, National Cancer Institute, Cancer Prevention and Research Summary: Nutrition
6-8 (May 1984); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CANCER PRE-
VENTION (1984) (recommending a "generous intake" of dietary fiber to help protect against
the increased risk of several cancers that are attributable to diet).
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A. Overall Contribution of Diet to Cancer Risk
The uncertainties that plague efforts to quantify the role of
other environmental factors affecting cancer incidence also encum-
ber estimates of the contribution of diet. A 1981 study by Doll and
Peto' ° stated with some confidence that a substantial portion of
cancers in both men and women could be attributed to dietary fac-
tors, and found support in the literature for estimates ranging from
ten to seventy percent.11 They offered their own assessment that
dietary changes eventually might result in a thirty-five percent re-
duction in deaths from cancer.12 The NRC Committee also found
convincing evidence that dietary patterns influence the incidence
of most types of cancer. The Committee, however, did not offer
quantitative estimates of the contribution of dietary patterns or
specific food constituents to overall cancer risk or attempt to fore-
cast the percentage reduction in incidence that might result from
dietary changes.13
B. Dietary Risk Factors for Cancer
1. Caloric Intake
Human evidence suggesting that total caloric intake may be a
risk factor for cancer is indirect; that is, the evidence is primarily
based on demonstrated associations between body weight or obes-
ity and cancer. Laboratory animals on restricted diets exhibit a
lower incidence of tumors than those on unrestricted diets, but this
observation is difficult to interpret because the lower incidence
might be the result of a reduction in the intake of some specific
nutrient, such as fat. Thus, neither epidemiological evidence nor
animal studies currently permit a confident conclusion about as-
sessment of the effect of total calories on the risk of cancer.14
2. Fats and Cholesterol
Epidemiological studies repeatedly have shown a direct corre-
lation between dietary fat levels and the occurrence of several can-
cers, especially breast, prostate, and colorectal cancer. Although
the NRC Committee noted that total dietary fat frequently corre-
10. Doll & Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of Avoidable Risks of
Cancer in the United States Today, 66 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1192 (1981).
11. Id. at 1226-35, 1258.
12. Id. at 1235.
13. NRC Report, supra note 5, at 2-9 to -10, 18-10 to -11.
14. Id. at 4-4 to -5.
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lates with saturated fat, it could not identify specific components
of fat as being responsible for the elevation in risk. The relation-
ship between fat consumption and cancer risk is corroborated by
animal studies. The NRC Report concluded that, of all the dietary
components studied, the combined human and experimental evi-




3. Protein and Carbohydrates
Epidemiological studies have suggested possible correlations
between protein intake and several cancers, but the literature is
more limited than the studies on the role of dietary fat. Because
there is a high correlation between levels of protein and fat in the
diets of most Western countries, the existing studies are difficult to
interpret. A few laboratory experiments suggest that the relation-
ship between cancer and protein consumption is similar to the link
between cancer and dietary fat. The NRC Report concluded, how-
ever, that although it is not yet possible to draw a firm conclusion,
high protein intake might be associated with certain cancers.16
Neither human nor animal studies permit a conclusion about the
role of carbohydrates in cancer incidence.
17
4. Non-Nutritive Substances
In addition to fats, proteins, and carbohydrates, a variety of
non-nutritive substances are natural constituents of human foods.
These include certain molds, nitrates and nitrites, and toxins syn-
thesized naturally by plants to ward off bacteria, fungi, and
predators. While a number of these substances are carcinogenic in
laboratory animal experiments, the NRC Committee found insuffi-
cient evidence that any non-nutritive substance makes a significant
contribution to human cancer risk.18
5. Alcohol
The NRC Committee found numerous reports implicating spe-
cific alcoholic beverages as risk factors for cancers of certain sites.
In several Western countries excessive beer drinking has been asso-
ciated with colorectal cancer. Limited evidence also shows that ex-
15. Id. at 5-17 to -21.
16. Id. at 6-11.
17. Id. at 7-4 to -5.
18. Id. at 12-23 to -25.
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cessive alcohol consumption causes hepatic injury and cirrhosis,
which may be precursors of liver cancer. In addition, convincing
evidence establishes that alcohol, when consumed in large quanti-
ties, acts synergistically with cigarette smoking to increase the risk
of cancers of the mouth, larynx, esophagus, and respiratory tract.19
6. Substances Created in Cooking and Processing
A chemical that is mutagenic to bacteria or other test orga-
nisms generally is regarded as potential carcinogen. Mutagens are
produced when meat or fish is charred at high temperatures.
Smoking of foods and charcoal broiling result in the deposition of
mutagenic and carcinogenic compounds on the surface of food. The
NRC Report concluded that it is not yet possible to assess whether
these by-products of processing are likely to contribute signifi-
cantly to cancer incidence in the United States. The Report, how-
ever, cited epidemiological evidence from other countries indicat-
ing that populations which frequently consume salt-cured or
smoked foods have a greater incidence of certain cancers, particu-
larly of the esophagus and stomach. 20
7. Food Additives and Chemical Contaminants
The NRC Committee noted that nearly 3000 substances inten-
tionally are incorporated in processed foods and another 12,000
man-made chemicals occasionally are detected in some foods. In
addition, low levels of a large group of environmental contami-
nants may be present in a variety of foods. While some of these
various substances have been found carcinogenic in animal studies,
the Committee found little evidence that additives or contami-
nants contribute significantly to the overall risk of cancer among
Americans.21
C. Possible Inhibitors of Carcinogenesis
While the NRC Report raised troubling questions about some
familiar dietary components of the United States food supply, it
19. Id. at 11-1 to -7.
20. Id. at 17-1 to -6.
21. Id. at 14-29; see also Doll & Peto, supra note 10, at 1235-37. These authors suggest
that chemical additives are not a significant source of cancer risk and that some additives
might even protect against cancer. The authors mention both indirect effects, such as
saccharin's potential reduction of risk-elevating obesity, id. at 1235, and direct effects, such
as antioxidants' inhibiting the formation of carcinogens and thereby reducing the risk of
stomach cancer, id. at 1237.
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also found that other dietary elements may reduce the risk of
cancer.
1. Dietary Fiber
Both epidemiological and experimental studies have examined
the hypothesis that high fiber diets protect against colorectal can-
cer. The NRC Committee found no "conclusive" evidence that di-
etary fiber exerts a protective effect in humans. 22 A more recent
report of the National Cancer Institute (NCI), however, is less
equivocal.23
2. Vitamins
A growing body of epidemiological evidence demonstrates an
inverse relationship between the risk of cancer and the consump-
tion of foods high in vitamin A, such as liver, or in its precursors
the carotenoids, such as, many green and yellow vegetables. Most
of the data are insufficient to determine whether the protective ef-
fects result from carotenoids, vitamin A itself, or some other con-
stituent of these foods. Laboratory evidence shows that vitamin A
and many of its synthetic analogues are able to suppress chemi-
cally induced tumors.24
The data on vitamin C are less convincing. The preventive ef-
fects observed in epidemiological studies have been tied to the con-
sumption of foods rich in vitamin C, rather than to consumption of
the vitamin itself. Nonetheless, the consumption of foods contain-
ing vitamin C is associated with a lower risk of cancers of the
stomach and esophagus.25
3. Minerals
A number of minerals have been suspected of playing a role,
some as inhibitors, in carcinogenesis. The NRC Committee, how-
ever, concluded that the data are insufficient to support any con-
clusions about the role of such common minerals as iron, zinc, cop-
per, molybdenum, iodine, arsenic, cadmium, and lead.26 The
Report did note that limited epidemiological studies and labora-
22. NRC Report, supra note 5, at 8-5.
23. See supra note 9.
24. Id. at 9-6 to -7.
25. Id. at 9-10.
26. Id. at 10-1 to -25. The FDA has characterized selenium as an animal carcinogen.
See 39 Fed. Reg. 1355 (1974).
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REDUCING DIET-INDUCED CANCER
tory experiments suggest that selenium may protect against risk."
D. The NRC Committee's Interim Dietary Guidelines
While the NRC Committee emphasized the primitive nature
of current understanding of the link between diet and cancer in
humans, it offered some guidelines for a risk-reducing diet that it
believed is consistent with good nutritional practices:
(1) The consumption of both saturated and unsaturated fats
should be reduced. A decrease from the current average level of
forty percent of total calories to thirty percent was characterized as
a prudent goal.
(2) Fruits, vegetables, and whole grain cereal products should
be included in significant proportions in all diets.
(3) Consumption of food preserved by salt curing, salt pick-
ling, or smoking should be minimized.
(4) Alcoholic beverages should be consumed, if at all, in
moderation.28
E. Implications of NRC Committee Findings
The NRC Committee did not purport to conduct new studies
of the relationship between diet and cancer; rather, it attempted to
summarize the findings of hundreds of individual researchers. But
even if the Committee's broader conclusions were already latent in
the literature, the NRC Report gave the conclusions visibility and
the imprimatur of the nation's most prestigious scientific body.
The Report suggests that the capacity of the traditional American
diet to contribute to cancer is a significant public health problem
that might not be addressed by current regulatory strategies. What
has traditionally been viewed as a problem of "pollution con-
trol"-the reduction or elimination of toxicants added to food by
man-now appears to be a problem of individual dietary patterns,
which are influenced powerfully by religion, tradition, and com-
merce. 29 The Report thus reveals that effective governmental ef-
27. NRC Report, supra note 5, at 10-7.
28. Id. at 1-14 to -16.
29. The comparison to environmental regulation yields some insights into the current
difficulties of food safety regulation. Congressional efforts to regulate food safety can be
analogized to other programs, such as the EPA's regulation of air pollution under the Clean
Air Act, that rely on a combination of ambient air quality standards designed to protect
health and locally devised emissions limits that may reflect a weighing of feasibility or other
offsetting constraints. The FD&C Act can be viewed as a series of health driven limits on
"emission" of "pollutants" into food that are not calibrated to any articulate standards of
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forts to reduce diet-related cancer will be constrained not only by
the limitations of science, such as in the capacity to test for carci-
nogenesis or to detect contaminants, but also by the unwillingness
or inability to control commercial activities or individual
autonomy.
One should not overlook the many uncertainties in the Com-
mittee's findings, which are stressed repeatedly in its Report. The
Committee drew on a vast array of published studies, which inevi-
tably prove to be of unequal quality. These studies' findings often
are expressly equivocal or later contradicted and are subject to
qualifications that accompany even the best investigations into the
causes of human cancer-qualifications that are inherent in retro-
spective epidemiology and animal toxicology. No member of the
Committee would claim that it had found evidence demonstrating
"beyond a reasonable doubt"-perhaps not even by "a preponder-
ance"-the strongest causal associations that it reported, including
the link between cancer incidence and dietary fat.
Persistent uncertainties may not, and probably should not,
impede all governmental action. What action is appropriate de-
pends not only on the strength of evidence of risk but also on the
nature of the governmental action contemplated. Less convincing
evidence might suffice to justify changes in government programs
that provide food for individuals, for example, members of the
armed services, than to support FDA -mandated modifications in
the composition of commercially marketed foods. Similarly, re-
quirements of information on the labels of foods might not require
the level of evidence necessary to justify banning a traditional
ingredient.
The NRC Report also holds implications for private entities,
including consumers, producers, and food merchandizers. Individu-
als may be inclined, and surely are entitled, to alter their personal
diets based on the Committee's conclusions. Perhaps a more im-
portant effect will be commercial efforts to exploit the NRC find-
ings in formulating and promoting foods and meals. Such private
initiatives in turn will pose questions for government regula-
tors-principally the FDA and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)-that are responsible for preventing misrepresentation of
foods in labeling and advertising.
diet quality, save for the unstated assumption that a traditional diet of natural foods is risk
free. The NRC Report can be viewed as undermining this "standard" of diet quality. The




III. IMPLICATIONS FOR AFFIRMATIVE FDA REGULATION
The implications of the NRC Report for the FDA's regulation
of food labeling, food quality or composition, and food safety are
this Articles' specific concern. To assess these implications requires
some understanding of the agency's current authority.30 The FDA
regulates the labeling of all non-meat and non-poultry foods mar-
keted in the United States,31 theoretically including foods sold in
restaurants and to institutions such as schools and hospitals. In
practice, however, the agency is concerned primarily with the in-
formation provided with foods sold for consumption in the home.
The 1938 FD&C Act mandates that the labels of all foods contain
certain information, such as net weight and statement of ingredi-
ents; authorizes the FDA to prescribe detailed label information
for special classes of foods, such as nutritional supplements; and
forbids label statements that are "false or misleading in any partic-
ular. '3 2 The Act also specifies that, in assessing whether state-
ments in labeling are misleading, the FDA or a court may take into
account material information that is omitted.33 Together, these
provisions empower the FDA to require any food label to bear just
about any information that the Agency believes necessary to in-
form consumers about the food's important characteris-
tics-presumably including its capacity to reduce or increase the
risk of disease.3 4 The FD&C Act also gave the FDA authority to
prescribe "standards of identity" for foods. Designed to assure that
consumers were not cheated by the sale of processed foods, such as
mayonnaise or fruit preserves, the Agency's early standards took
the form of detailed recipes.3 At one time the FDA identity stan-
30. See Hutt, supra note 5, for a comprehensive examination of the FDA's authority,
and the authorities of the FTC and the USDA as well.
31. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321 (m), (n), 343 (1982). See generally R. MERRILL & P. Hurr,
FOOD AND DRUG LAw ch. 11 (1980) (discussing the regulation of food labeling).
32. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1982).
33. Id. at § 321(n).
34. This conclusion may overstate the scope of the FDA's authority to prescribe the
content of food labels. Its ability to force affirmative disclosures-as distinct from its ability
to prevent misleading statements-is hinged to the claims that a manufacturer makes about
a food, expressly or implicitly in its name or in the purpose for which it is promoted. For
example, the Agency has retreated from mandating nutrition labeling on all foods, prefer-
ring instead to require such labeling only when a nutritional claim is made or implied and to
prescribe a standard format for nutritional labeling when it is undertaken voluntarily. See
R. MERRILL & P. Hurr, supra note 31, at 265-68 (quoting 38 Fed. Reg. 2125 (1973)).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1982). For a discussion of the FDA's food standard program, see
Merrill & Collier, "Like Mother Used To Make". An Analysis of FDA Food Standards of
Identity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 561 (1974).
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dards covered approximately fifty percent of all foods sold in the
United States. While the standards stabilized the composition of
basic foods, they also deterred the marketing of substi-
tutes-including some formulations that reduced traditional con-
stituents precisely to serve a perceived health need, for example
cholesterol free eggs. In the early 1970's, the FDA instead began to
prescribe "common or usual names" for substitutes for many tradi-
tional foods-names that incorporated disclosure of compositional
information believed to be important to consumers. With judicial
confirmation of this alternative approach, 6 the FDA now can claim
authority to prescribe the composition of virtually any food,
through a standard of identity, or to mandate disclosure, as part of
the name, of important information about the composition of un-
standardized foods.
The final weapon in the FDA's arsenal is the authority to pre-
vent the sale of unsafe foods.37 The Agency's power to condemn
any food that contains an "added" material rendering the food po-
tentially hazardous betrays the statute's preoccupation with for-
eign constituents. The Agency also may condemn foods whose nat-
ural constituents render them "ordinarily injurious" to health-a
rarely invoked standard that historically has been assumed to im-
pose a heavy burden to prove likelihood of harm. Both of these
original provisions of the 1938 Act probably were aimed at food
constituents that threatened immediate harm, such as poisons,
rather than at long-term hazards. Later amendments, inspired by
concern about such hazards, have authorized the FDA to demand
premarket testing of, and to issue licenses for, constituents used to
make fabricated foods or utilized in food production in ways that
make their entry into foods likely. These foreign constituents in-
clude food additives, color additives, animal drugs, packaging
materials and other "indirect" additives, and pesticide residues,
which comprise most of the substances man might "add" to food.
The only other man-made constituents are environmental contami-
nants, for which the FDA can set tolerance levels.38
36. See American Frozen Food Inst. v. Mathews, 413 F. Supp. 548 (D.D.C. 1976), afl'd
sub noma. American Frozen Food Inst. v. Califano, 555 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per
curiam).
37. See generally Merrill, supra note 4, at 184-241 (discussing the regulatory stan-
dards that the FDA applies in determining whether to ban food constituents).
38. See generally Merrill & Schewel, FDA Regulation of Environmental Contami-
nants of Food, 66 VA. L. REv. 1357 (1980) (focusing on the FDA's standards and procedures
for determining acceptable contamination levels in foods unintentionally contaminated
with potentially hazardous substances).
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This battery of regulatory authorities gives the FDA both
comprehensive control over all substances advertently added to
foods and reasonably effective authority over the marketing of
foods that become contaminated with hazardous substances. Al-
though the regulatory scheme does not function perfectly, it does
not display major gaps, and, at least in theory, the scheme permits
the FDA to prescribe, ex ante, the conditions of use of virtually all
added substances and conditions of sale of foods containing them.
Even so, as one contemplates regulatory action to implement the
most cogent findings of the NRC Report, the current system seems
ill-fitting for at least four reasons. First, as previously noted, the
current system focuses on the safety of added constituents individ-
ually rather than on their collective effects. Second, although the
FDA makes informed assumptions about likely dietary exposure in
deciding whether or on what terms to license ingredients, the
Agency generally does not attempt to alter the consumer dietary
patterns that might have health significance. Third, the regulatory
system generally contemplates binary responses from the FDA; a
substance either is permitted or it is not. The Delaney Clause 9
makes this structure explicit for any additive found to cause cancer
in man or animals. Finally, the system correspondingly places little
reliance on consumers to protect themselves; the FDA's decisions
to allow foods to be marketed are understood as confirming the
fundamental safety of those foods. In short, the system is designed
to set "emission limits" for foreign toxicants in foods, not to con-
vey information that would enable consumers to control the long-
term risks associated with dietary choices.
Perversely, the current system for setting "emission limits" for
food constituents embodies criteria that appear to be the reverse of
those implied by the NRC Report. The law applies the most strin-
gent test-freedom from any risk of harm-to food and color addi-
tives, whose contribution to cancer incidence the NRC Committee
was unable to discern."' As a corollary, the law applies the most
relaxed standard-forbidden only if "ordinarily injurious"-to un-
processed foods of natural origin, many of which include high
levels of constituents that pose a cancer risk which the Committee
ranked the highest.
41
39. See supra note 4 for text of Delaney Clause.
40. See supra text accompanying note 21.
41. The NRC Committee's assessment surely is not the final word on the issue of
which food constituents pose the greatest risk. Bruce Ames, a distinguished scientist in the
field, has speculated that the major culprits may be substances produced by nature to pro-
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This apparent anomaly42 can be explained, however, wholly
apart from the difference between the time of enactment of the
key statutory provisions and the recent confirmation of the rela-
tionship between diet and cancer. Broadly speaking, the Act's di-
verse safety criteria reflect not differing assessments of the risks
posed by various categories of added constitutents, but perceived
differences in our capacity or willingness to limit human exposure
to them. Theoretically, regulators easily could assure that consum-
ers are not exposed to a hazardous ingredient by making it a crime
to add the substance to food.'3 It is usually more difficult, however,
to limit exposure to an industrial by-product whose presence in
food is discovered only after a sizeable segment of the food supply
is contaminated, for example, the polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)
contamination of fish caught in the Great Lakes." And it may be
even more-difficult to limit exposure to substances found naturally
in the unprocessed products of American agriculture. Conse-
quently, the present law's apparent ordering of risks betrays the
legislature's ranking of benefits.45
IV. OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPEDIMENTS
While the FDA will encounter difficulties if it seeks to imple-
ment the findings of the NRC Report, the major impediments do
not reflect deficiencies in the current law but more practical diffi-
culties. The practical difficulties include the preliminary character
of the Committee's findings, the continuing uncertainty surround-
ing the link between diet and cancer, and, most significantly, the
resistance of both American agriculture and consumers to dramatic
changes in dietary patterns. These obstacles become obvious as one
considers the Report's basic messages:
(1) The major dietary risk factors are not chemicals added by
tect plants from disease and predators. See Ames, Dietary Carcinogens and Anticarci-
nogens, 221 ScL 1256 (1983).
42. The current law is criticized in Food Safety in the United States, Report of the
Committee for a Study of Saccharin and Food Safety Policy, Institute of Medicine and
National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences (March 1979).
43. By use of the term "easily" I mean that such regulation would not confront tech-
nological obstacles. It could confront political obstacles, however, as the FDA's aborted ef-
fort to ban saccharin has demonstrated.
44. It can be argued that these cases reveal no difference in principle-that is, that
control of any food constituent is limited only by our willingness to pay the cost. This in-
sight of economics, however, does not refute the observation that the current law's catego-
ries reflect congressional perceptions of differing "benefits."
45. See, e.g., Pape, Legislative Issues in Food Safety Regulation, in SociAL REOULA-
TION: STRATEGIES FOR REFORM (1982).
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man but inherent constituents of traditional and popular foods.
(2) The major risks stem from lifelong ingestion of classes of
foods rather than short-term exposure to a few easily identified
foods. Moreover, foods are not categorizable as "dangerous" or
"safe," but as "better" or "worse" in their contribution to cancer
risk. Thus, moderation and substitution are more practical guides
to behavior than banning or abstinence. Correspondingly, risk re-
duction requires individual daily attention to dietary choices
rather than one-time decisions about which foods to eat or to
avoid.
(3) Most significantly, the NRC Report suggests that the ag-
gregate consumption of food constituents-both those associated
with increased risk and those believed to be protective-influences
the risk of cancer. This last message has profound implications, for
it suggests that regulators must shift their focus from the safety of
individual foods to the composition of diets. Diet-induced cancer
should be viewed as a novel problem of behavior modification
rather than a traditional problem of market regulation.
A. Regulation of Food Composition
1. Assuring Additive Safety
While the NRC Committee found little evidence that added
chemicals have contributed to cancer incidence, this conclusion
simply may reflect the overall success of regulation in preventing
the introduction of toxic additives and in curtailing the sale of
dangerously contaminated foods. It does not support an argument
for abandoning premarket screening of the safety of new com-
pounds or the monitoring of foods for industrial residues.
2. Controlling Food Composition
One ought not neglect the composition of individual foods in
assessing opportunities for effective regulatory intervention. If the
amount of fat in foods comprising major sources of calories for
Americans could be reduced by twenty-five percent, and consum-
ers did not substitute new higher-fat foods, one could expect a sig-
nificant reduction in cancer incidence. If protein were confirmed as
an independent cancer risk factor, reductions in protein levels like-
wise could lower risk. Conceivably, reductions in risk also might be
achievable through the addition of constituents that provide a pro-
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tective effect.46 Because the association between dietary fat and
cancer incidence appears well established, that relationship pro-
vides a useful example.
Assuming that a twenty-five percent reduction in dietary fat is
the goal, the FDA should have two objectives. First, it should seek
opportunities to mandate reductions in the amount of fat in indi-
vidual foods. Second, it should eliminate requirements that impede
reductions undertaken voluntarily by food producers. The Agency
has the legal authority to pursue both objectives. Under section
401 of the FD&C Act,47 the FDA is empowered to promulgate
mandatory standards of identity prescribing the composi-
tion-including the amount of fat-of products sold as particular
foods, such as mayonnaise.48 Furthermore, the Agency surely may
amend existing standards of identity that mandate minimum levels
of overall fat or fat of a particular origin, for example butter
fat-requirements which are often based on the assumption that
fat is an index of product quality.
The FDA would encounter problems in the pursuit of each of
these objectives. First, reducing fat might alter the palatability of
some foods and thus cause consumers to substitute other high fat
foods. The Agency might hear claims of product degradation, and
resulting deception, from consumers who prefer the immediate en-
joyment of the traditional food to the much more remote benefits
of reduced risk. Furthermore, experience suggests that food pro-
ducers and ingredient suppliers would vigorously resist signficiant
changes in existing standards of identity-even changes merely
permitting reductions in fat.49 A standard of identity that sets a
minimum level of fat for a food traditionally has assured manufac-
turers that they will not face competition from diluted products
46. The NRC Committee does not recommend the use of supplemental vitamins A or
C or other possibly protective nutrients, but rather endorses the foods in which they occur
naturally on the prudent ground that the effects observed may be attributable to other con-
stituents. NRC Report, supra note 5, at 144, 147.
47. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1982). See generally, Merrill & Collier, supra note 35 (discussing
the costs and benefits of food standards).
48. Compare the FDA's standard for mayonnaise, 21 C.F.R. § 169.140 (mandating at
least 65% oil), with its standard for salad dressing, 21 C.F.R. § 169.150 (requiring only 30%
oil).
49. For example, when the FDA attempted to revise the standard of identity for ice
cream to permit use of cassein as an ingredient, it met withering criticism from domestic
suppliers of other milk-based constituents, whose market would be damaged by the liberali-
zation. They were joined by members of Congress with close attachments to the dairy indus-




sold under the same name and has provided a guaranteed market
for the suppliers of the fat ingredient. Many remaining "recipe"
standards cover dairy products, and the FDA has been notably un-
successful in relaxing those products' fat requirements. Moreover,
for some standardized foods containing significant fat, there even
may be plausible health reasons to resist changes in formulation. 0
The current statutory procedures for amending or repealing
standards of identity give defenders of the traditional formula an
effective weapon against change. The FD&C Act prescribes on-the-
record rulemaking for the adoption of regulations under section
401, permitting any party who objects to a proposed stan-
dard-including any change in an existing standard-to force the
FDA to hold a formal evidentiary hearing.51 As a practical matter,
this procedural right means that controversial changes in existing
standards of identity are rarely implemented. Nonetheless, among
existing standards of identity, particularly those that mandate a
minimum level of fat, there are surely some plausible candidates
for an amendment allowing manufacturers to reduce fat without
forfeiting use of the food name. There also may be some candi-
dates for new or amended food standards that would impose maxi-
mum limits on fat for the purpose of reducing overall dietary fat.
In addition, the FDA could broaden opportunities for marketing
reduced fat competitors for standardized products by viewing them
as outside the identity standards.
It should be noted, however, that the major source of dietary
fat-meat and meat products-is not as malleable by government
edict as most dairy products, whose composition is more often a
matter of design than of nature. Animal husbandry practices can
affect the levels of fat in meat, but not as dramatically as the FDA
can alter the composition of cheese. The United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) has comparable authority over the
composition of processed meat and poultry products, but these
items comprise only part of the market for meat and poultry prod-
ucts. Major reductions in the amount of fat that Americans now
50. Some dairy products, such as milk, may provide a major source of calories and
other nutrients for some segments of the population. (Both the FDA and the EPA assume
for purposes of estimating exposure to pesticide and other residues that milk represents
100% of the diet of infants. E.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 17,094 (1979)). If it were shown that fat
content does make product quality, the FDA could allow manufacturers to determine how
much fat to include but require disclosure of the amount of fat on food labels. But this
option would leave open the possibility that most versions of a food will remain high in fat,
thus shifting the burden of risk reduction to the consumer.
51. See R MERRILL & P. Hurr, supra note 31, at 189, 231, 889-901.
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consume from meat will require significant changes in consumption
patterns as well as modification of government compositional
requirements.
Government agencies that provide foods or meals to individu-
als-through school lunches, food stamps, the feeding of institu-
tionalized populations-might have greater opportunities to effect
reductions in dietary fat. These agencies confront fewer procedural
impediments to implementing change, and their effective control
over the actual dispensing of foods provides greater assurance of
compliance. Yet these agencies, too, surely would encounter resis-
tance from clients, who may view the dispensing of reduced fat,
"lower quality" foods as disparaging, and from food suppliers, who
may have a major stake in the continued sale of high fat products
or ingredients.2
B. Transmission of Dietary Information
For major changes in American eating habits to occur, con-
sumers will require straightforward information-not merely re-
ports of scientific studies-about individual foods, meal com-
posites, and long-term eating habits. Although providing that
information may not alone be sufficient to bring about significant
changes in dietary patterns, it is an essential first step. Consumers
obtain information about foods from several sources, both public
and private. In theory, the federal government can dictate, or at
least influence, the information provided by both sources-as au-
thor of official communications, such as USDA pamphlets for
homemakers, and as regulator of commercial messages from food
distributors, both in labeling and advertising.
1. Government-Authored Information
The numerous possibilities for official communication of
health enhancing dietary advice offer diverse prospects for success
and pose varied problems of implementation. The USDA has a
long tradition of distributing useful information to homemakers
and no doubt has exercised positive influence on the nation's eat-
ing habits. One may question, however, whether the Department's
traditional routes of communication-through Government Print-
ing Office publications, local outreach programs, public schools,
52. Because the Department of Agriculture, the agency responsible for both the school
lunch and food stamp programs, retains close ties to the meat and dairy industries, one
might expect innovations in these programs to come quite slowly.
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and colleges-retain major influence in a society in which meal
preparation often is shared among family members and in which
the percentage of meals commercially prepared continues to grow.
Another obstacle to effective USDA intervention on the diet-and-
cancer issue is the Department's historical allegiance to producers
of grain, meat, and dairy products, whose interests conflict with
effective implementation of the NRC Committee's advice. Similar
pressures are likely to be felt by other public agencies that play
roles in educating consumers, including local governmental bodies
and educational institutions.
2. Government Regulation of Commercial Messages
Many regulatory opportunities are open to the FDA and, in its
role as regulator of advertising,3 to the FTC. For the FDA, the
regulatory weapons include required disclosures in labeling and
evaluation of claims volunteered by food marketers who seek to
exploit the NRC Report.
a. Mandated Label Information
As noted previously, the FDA possesses adequate legal author-
ity to require food labels to bear almost any pertinent and plausi-
ble information concerning the food. The more difficult issues in-
volve the information that should be required, the form it should
take to be understandable, and the constraints that the inherent
limits of the label format impose. As early as 1979, the FDA had
acknowledged the limitations of the labeling format in an analo-
gous context:
[A] requirement for warnings on all foods that may contain an inherent carci-.
nogenic ingredient or a carcinogenic contaminant (in contrast to a deliber-
ately added carcinogenic substance) would apply to many, perhaps most,
foods in a supermarket. Such warnings would be so numerous they would
confuse the public, would not promote informed consumer decisionmaking,
and would not advance the public health.5
The NRC Committee's brief recommendations still are too
prolix to incorporate in the labels of most foods-which already
53. See P. MERRILL & P. HuTr, supra note 31, at 134.
54. 44 Fed. Reg. 59,513 (1979). The Agency was responding to comments on a proposal
to require a label warning on hair dyes that contained trace amounts of a carcinogen. Critics
had pointed to the anomaly in the Agency's failure to require warnings about food constitu-
ents that appeared to pose substantially greater risks. The Agency's response ignored the
possibility of labeling based on levels of risk-an approach that might be feasible with indi-
vidual toxicants, but one that would not easily accommodate the sorts of findings about
general dietary practices prescribed by the NRC Committee.
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contain much useful information required by statute, such as net
weight and a list of ingredients, and by FDA regulation, such as
nutrition information.5 5 Furthermore, those recommendations,
with the possible exception of the caution concerning alcoholic
beverages, themselves do not seem suited for the labels of specific
foods. The recommendations do suggest, however, other product
specific information that might be useful, such as mandatory dis-
closure of fat content. But the bare disclosure of fat content, al-
ready a part of nutrition labeling, may be inadequate without addi-
tional information placing the disclosure in context-such as a
statement that a high fat diet increases the risk of cancer. Even a
bare statement of the percentage of fat would not reveal whether a
food is an important source of dietary fat, or whether the food con-
tains more or less fat than possible substitutes."
These speculations do not demonstrate that the FDA should
refrain from trying to influence dietary habits through mandated
label information, but they do hint at the complexity of the under-
taking. As with nutrition labeling, the FDA must consider the roles
of particular foods in the diet, other useful information on food
labels, the interchangeability of foods, and the other sources of in-
formation that attentive consumers can consult in evaluating the
sparse text of food labels. The agency also must take into account
consumer buying habits-to the extent they are known. Many con-
sumers pay attention to food labels, particularly when they wish to
avoid particular constitutents, but a vast number ignore labels.
5
7
Predictably, those who do consult labels tend to be well educated,
conscientious about diet, and exposed to other information that
enables them to evaluate food labels. Further investigation might
suggest that the persons whose dietary habits now place them at
the greatest risk are precisely those least likely to be reached by
innovations in food labels.
The NRC Report suggests other food labeling initiatives. It
cautions against excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages, par-
ticularly by people who smoke. One could visualize a requirement
55. See R. MERRLL & P. HuTr, supra note 31, at 148-50, 265-73.
56. There may be some question about the FDA's authority to require the marketer of
Food A to include in its label information about Food B (for example, "this food contains
X% fat, by comparison with Food B, which contains only Y% fat"). But resolution of this
issue is not the key to the FDA's ability, should it have the desire, to incorporate many of
the NRC Report's findings in food labels.
57. See Good Housekeeping Institute, Survey of Consumer Response to Food Label-




that alcoholic beverages bear a statement regarding the link be-
tween alcohol and cancer, but such speculation invites comparison
with other proposed or implemented label warnings. One obvious
parallel, the warning on cigarettes, has sparked two decades of con-
troversy over its factual bases and its effectiveness in discouraging
smoking.58 The cigarette warning experience does not nullify the
utility of a warning about alcoholic beverages, but it does forecast
the sort of political obstacles that such an initiative would encoun-
ter and raises questions about a warning's ability to alter behavior.
As a final obstacle, under a long-standing interagency agreement,
the FDA in effect has surrendered its authority over the labeling of
alcoholic beverages to the Treasury Department."
Two other classes of foods effectively escape federal labeling
requirements: fresh fruits and vegetables, which the NRC Commit-
tee found may protect against some cancers, and restaurant meals.
The FDA never has acknowledged that either category falls outside
its jurisdiction. The Agency toyed with a proposal to require nutri-
tion labeling for fresh fruits and vegetables 6°--through the use of
point-of-sale notices, and it has considered requiring fast-food op-
erators to provide nutrition information as well."' But the difficulty
of adapting labeling rules to foods that are sold without labels and
the costs of effective enforcement-FDA inspectors would have to
visit every grocery store and every restaurant-thus far have frus-
trated all initiatives to mandate point-of-sale information about
these increasingly important classes of food.
There are other obstacles to effective communication of the
NRC Committee's findings to consumers. The scientific bases for
the Committee's recommendations are arcane and complex. Most
members of the Committee no doubt would be reluctant to em-
brace statements simple enough to reach many audiences-for ex-
ample, "eating carrots and cabbage will reduce your risk of stom-
58. See, e.g., Smoking Prevention Health and Education Act of 1983: Hearings on S.
98-232 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983).
59. See R. MERRILL & P. Hurr, supra note 31, at 163-64.
60. See 40 Fed. Reg. 8214 (1975); see also 48 Fed. Reg. 27, 266 (1983) (withdrawing
proposal to require nutrition labeling for fresh fruits and vegetables).
61. No official document chronicles the FDA's periodic entertainment and later rejec-
tions of suggestions for "point of sale" information about the composition of restaurant
meals. The author here draws on personal experience as the FDA's Chief Counsel from 1975
to 1977. Note that in 1979 the FDA and the USDA announced that they would not take




ach cancer." Some of the associations between diet and cancer
incidence are strong as epidemiological findings go, but they fall
short of proof of causation. Therefore, even the strongest findings
of diet/cancer association simply may not support the blunt con-
clusions that regulators and consumers will require.
6 2
Furthermore, the risk in question-the increased likelihood of
cancer-may seem extremely remote to many consumers. Other
authoritative assessments of risk, as convincing as those of the
NRC Committee, have not produced the changes in personal be-
havior necessary to effectuate their recommendations. As exam-
ples, consider the continued low level of seat belt usage and the
equivocal evidence of whether cigarette label warnings have influ-
enced individual smoking habits.6 3 In each of these cases, the tem-
poral remoteness of the risk described dilutes consumer response.
Likewise, it is difficult to believe that the to dietary patterns the
NRC Committee wishes to discourage will prove readily suscepti-
ble to modification. Dietary habits may be even less malleable to
change than smoking habits. Smoking involves routine exposure to
foreign substances whose character surely appears suspicious. By
contrast consumers regard eating health enhancing and as involv-
ing ingestion of materials believed to be "good for you."
b. Limits on Product Claims
While the NRC Report and subsequent NCI dietary recom-
mendations have disturbed producers of some foods whose sales
would suffer from changes in dietary patterns, marketers of other
products have discovered new commercial opportunities. Even a
casual viewer of television is likely to have seen recent advertise-
ments for Kellogg's "All Bran" cereal, which explicitly refer to the
National Cancer Institute's (NCI's) endorsement of dietary fiber.
Another firm is marketing a tablet under the name "Healthy
Greens," promising that it incorporates nutrients believed protec-
tive against cancer. These commercial initiatives, which no doubt
will be followed by other companies, have attracted the attention
62. See Motor-Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983)
(overturning the Department of Transportation's decision to revoke the requirement for
mandatory passive restraint systems).
63. Here we may detect a distinction between the type of evidence sufficient to justify
voluntary claims in labeling or advertising-such as those made for Kellogg's "All Bran"




of the FDA and the FTC.6 4 Both agencies have a history of impa-
tience with claims that seek to exploit preposterous, speculative, or
even merely preliminary reports of scientific investigations associ-
ating health benefits with specific products or practices. 5 Both
agencies have authority to invoke legal sanctions against false or
deceptive claims for foods. The very uncertainty of the NRC Com-
mittee's conclusions, however, makes vigorous prosecution of exag-
gerated "reduce your risk to cancer" claims difficult, and perhaps
even undesirable in some cases.
The FDA has two regulatory weapons it could enlist in any
effort to curb overstated claims about foods offering qualities that
the NRC Committee found might reduce the risk of cancer. First,
the Agency could require manufacturers who make risk reducing
label claims to incorporate appropriate qualifications, or face mis-
branding charges under sections 201(n) and 403(a) of the FD&C
Act.6 Section 201(n) permits consideration of omissions from la-
beling in assessing whether statements actually made are false or
misleading. Thus, for example, the FDA might challenge Kellogg's
"All Bran" claim-"the NCI reports that fiber reduces your risk of
cancer"-for failing to state that the NRC Committee, on the
other hand, found inadequate evidence for such an association. If
Kellogg made no such claims in labeling, however, the matter falls
to the FTC, whose authority to require affirmative disclosures, ab-
sent a prior finding of deception, is uncertain.
The second weapon available to the FDA is the use of a theory
it has invoked successfully to combat more dubious promotions.
The Agency could assert that Kellogg actually is making a "drug"
claim for its cereal-that is, a claim of disease prevention-and,
since the effectiveness of "All Bran" in reducing the risk of disease
is not "generally recognized," the product is a "new drug" whose
efficacy must be demonstrated affirmatively before it can be mar-
64. See, e.g., Mayer, FDA Studies Advertising for Kellogg's All-Bran, The Washing-
ton Post, Nov. 6, 1984, at El, col. 4.
65. See, e.g., V.E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1957); United
States v. "Vitasafe Formula M", 266 F. Supp. 266 (D.N.J. 1964); United States v. 119 Cases
. . . "New Dextra Brand Fortified Cane Sugar.. .", 231 F. Supp. 551 (D. Fla. 1963). See
generally R. MERRILL & P. HuTr, supra note 31, at 216-228 (providing edited versions of
these cases). FDA regulations prohibit label statements that a food is adequate for the pre-
vention or treatment of disease, 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(i)(1) (1977), and the Agency reaffirmed
that policy in 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 75,990, 77,006-77,007 (1979).
66. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(m), (n), 343(a) (1982); see, e.g., Research Laboratories, Inc. v.
United States, 167 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1948).
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keted 6 7 In short, the FDA would point to the product's advertising
to demonstrate the purpose for which it was being sold-that is, as
a drug-and then shackle the product to obviously unachieveable
standards of drug effectiveness. This would be an extreme re-
sponse, but one that, if successful, would stifle the types of claims
that now disconcert the Agency.
One may ask why the FDA might be concerned about the
claims made for "All Bran." After all, these claims are relatively
modest, they accurately describe the recommendation of the Na-
tional Cancer Institute, 8 and they do not repudiate any of the con-
clusions of the NRC Committee. Furthermore, as the NRC Report
intimates, the claims could be true. The FDA has a history of sus-
picion of health promotion claims whose scientific basis is dubious
or uncertain. The concerns inspiring this suspicion are understand-
able: the Agency fears that consumers will be misled into purchas-
ing products that not only fail to fulfill the health claims made for
them, but also that have no other legitimate rationale. This indict-
ment probably cannot be leveled against "All Bran" cereal or fresh
vegetables, whose consumption the NRC Report explicitly en-
dorses. Even if the theory that fiber or vitamin A protects against
cancer is unsubstantiated, individuals who increase their consump-
tion of these products will not have been harmed significantly.
A product like "Healthy Greens" presents a different problem.
A product advertised as providing the disease prevention value of
fresh vegetables, but that offers no other attribute of vegetables, is
deceptive unless two things are true. First, the foods that the prod-
uct simulates must possess the disease preventing qualities
claimed. Second, the synthetic product must contain the constitu-
ents that make fresh vegetables protective against disease.6 9 Uncer-
67. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1982); see also Alberty Food Prods. Co. v. United States,
185 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1950) (finding vitamin and mineral supplements to be mislabeled
because of advertising); R. MERRmL & P. Hurr, supra note 31, at 315-17 (discussing cases
holding drugs to be mislabeled because the labels did not state the purpose or condition for
which the drugs were intended).
68. Apparently Kellogg consulted with officials at the National Cancer Institute before
launching its "All Bran" campaign; FDA officials, however, have voiced resentment that the
company never discussed the issue with them. See Mayer, supra note 64, at E5, col. 3.
69. When the FDA has attempted to combat the marketing of fabricated products
that incorporate nutrients found naturally in agricultural commodities on the grounds that
they are nutritionally unsound or not the nutritionally preferred "vehicle" for those nutri-
ents, the Agency has met resistance. See, e.g., United States v. 119 Cases. . . "New Dextra
Brand Fortified Cane Sugar. . .", 231 F. Supp. 551 (D. Fla. 1963). Thus, the NRC Commit-
tee's recommendation against supplements of vitamins A or C, by itself, probably would not
be a basis for attacking a product such as "Healthy Greens."
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tainty about the existence of a protective effect for the vegetables
themselves and ignorance about the source of any such effect may
impede a government charge that the product is deceptive. These
impediments, however, should not bar an FDA claim that the
product is a drug whose effectiveness must be demonstrated. The
difficult determination will be whether the claims made for the
product can be characterized as disease prevention-that is, as
drug claims.
This Article does not intimate answers to these issues; its pur-
pose is to depict another arena in which the recent speculations
about diet's contribution to cancer incidence have implications for
government regulators generally, and for the FDA specifically. The
nature of these speculations arguably poses a novel dilemma for
FDA officials. The dietary practices recommended by the NRC
Committee and by the NCI have plausibility quite apart from their
possible role in cancer prevention. For example, reduced dietary
fat could lower the risk of heart attack, and a diet containing less
fat and more fruits and vegetables than the "average" diet would
reduce obesity. Thus, the government may desire people to follow
the recommendations even if they prove futile in reducing can-
cer-and product claims calculated to effect such dietary patterns
could be benign even if overstated or wrong. Furthermore, the va-
rious recommendations of the NRC Committee are linked together
in one important sense: promotion of products fulfilling one of
these recommendations may help popularize other recommenda-
tions. Therefore, Kellogg's claims for "All Bran," invoking the NCI
endorsement of fiber, may raise the visibility of other suggestions
as well-including the recommendation to reduce dietary fat. Ac-
cordingly, the FDA and the FTC perhaps should display tolerance
in assessing the capacity for specific products to mislead.
V. CONCLUSION
The growing evidence that dietary patterns significantly affect
human cancer incidence has profound implications for public
health authorities. Bodies responsible for investigating the causes
of cancer and for developing treatment-most notably the Na-
tional Cancer Institute-no doubt will be grappling with these im-
plications for decades to come. Primary responsibility for translat-
ing our improved understanding of the etiology of cancer into
public policy lies with these bodies.
The NRC Report, and the scientific studies on which it relies,
quite clearly have a message for the agencies responsible for regu-
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lating the safety and quality of commercially marketed foods, pri-
marily the FDA and the USDA. The NRC Report suggests oppor-
tunities for new regulatory initiatives that could make significant
contributions to reduction in cancer incidence by altering the con-
tent of some foods and by providing consumers information that
will assist them in modifying their own diets. The greatest oppor-
tunities for creative health promotion probably lie in increasing
consumer understanding of the long-term health implications of
different dietary practices, for it is at the level of individual choice
of foods and meals that change must come if diet-associated cancer
is to be reduced. We should not anticipate, however, that signifi-
cant changes will occur quickly. The central recommendation of
the NRC Committee calls for a one-third reduction in fat con-
sumption by the general population-a massive change in dietary
patterns that would have far reaching, and, in the short term dam-
aging consequences for United States agriculture. A direct call for
a thirty-three percent reduction in beef, pork, and dairy produc-
tion would produce cries of anguish from the farm community, and
from their representatives in Washington. The NRC Report en-
dorses dietary changes destined, if accomplished, to have the
equivalent effect. We should not be surprised, therefore, to find
regulatory agencies proceeding cautiously and many food produc-
ers seriously questioning the scientific bases for this proposed diet-
ary revolution.
Although focusing on the practical impediments to regulatory
implementation of the NRC Committee's dietary recommendations
(and similar future recommendations), this Article does not sug-
gest that the effort is not worth pursuing. The discussion here ac-
knowledges the significance of the Committee's findings for public
health; the NRC Report reveals several ways in which Americans
potentially could achieve dramatic reductions in cancer incidence.
Additionally, existing statutes in principle provide the FDA (and
the USDA and the FTC) with ample authority to effectuate almost
any sensible regulatory requirements. The difficulty confronting
regulators, therefore, is in determining just what policies make
sense when the accumulating scientific evidence indicts dietary
practices supported by long tradition, evident consumer prefer-
ence, and powerful economic interests.70
70. See Hutt, supra note 5, at 68-70.
[Vol. 38:513
